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Abstract: Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has 
been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the 
evolution of continuous strategy distributions given bilinear and quadratic payoff functions for 
any initial distribution to answer the following question—given the initial distribution of strategies 
in a game, how will it evolve over time? I look at several specific examples, including normal 
distribution on the entire line, normal truncated distribution, as well as exponential, uniform and 
Gamma distributions.  
I show that the class of exponential distributions is invariant with respect to replicator dynamics in 
games with bilinear payoff functions. I show also that the class of normal distributions is invariant 
with respect to replicator dynamics in games with quadratic payoff functions. In the case of 
quadratic payoffs with a negative quadratic term, regardless of the considered initial distributions, 
the current distribution of strategies becomes normal, full or truncated, that either tends to a 
distribution concentrated in a single point (so that the limit state of the population is 
monomorphic) or the distribution “goes to infinity”. In the case of a positive quadratic term, the 
limit state of the population may be dimorphic.  
The developed method can now be applied to a broad class of questions pertaining to evolution 
of strategies in games with different payoff functions and different initial distributions. 
Keywords: continuous strategy space; quadratic payoff function; evolution of distribution; HKV 
method 
 
Introduction 
Game-theoretic approach to population dynamics developed by Maynard Smith [1,2] and 
many other authors (see, for example, Reference [3]) assumes that individual fitness results from 
payoffs received during pairwise interactions that depend on individual phenotypes or strategies. 
The approach to studying strategy-dependent payoffs in the case of a finite number of 
strategies is as follows. Assume 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) is the payoff received by an individual using strategy 𝑥 
against one using strategy 𝑦. If there is a finite number of possible strategies (or traits), then 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) 
is an entry of the payoff matrix. Alternatively, the number of strategies may belong to a continuous 
rather than discrete set of values. The case when individuals in the population use strategies that are 
parameterized by a single real variable x that belongs to a closed and bounded interval [𝑎, 𝑏] was 
studied in [4–10] as well as many others. A brief survey of recent results on continuous state games 
can be found in Reference [6]. 
Specifically, the case of quadratic payoff function was considered in References [11,12] and 
some others.  
Taylor and Jonker [13] offered a dynamical approach for game analysis known as replicator 
dynamics that allows tracing evolution of a distribution of individual strategies/traits. Typically, it 
is assumed that every individual uses one of finitely many possible strategies parameterized by 
real numbers; in this case, the Taylor-Jonker equation can be reduced to a system of differential 
equations and solved using well-developed methods, subject to practical limitations stemming 
from possible high dimensionality of the system. 
Here, I extend the approach of studying games with strategies that are parameterized by a 
continuous set of values to study the evolution of strategy (trait) distributions over time. 
Specifically, I develop a method that allows computing the current distribution for games with 
bilinear, quadratic, as well as several more general payoff functions at any time and for any initial 
distribution. The approach is close to the HKV (after hidden keystone variables) method developed 
in References [14–16] used for modeling evolution of heterogeneous populations and 
communities. It allows generation of more general results than have previously been possible. 
Results 
1. Master Model 
Consider a closed inhomogeneous population, where every individual is characterized by a 
qualitative trait (or strategy) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, where 𝑋 ⊆ 𝑅 is a subset of real numbers. X can be a closed and 
bounded interval [𝑎, 𝑏], a positive set of real numbers 𝑅+or the total set of real numbers R. Parameter 
x describes an individual’s inherited invariant properties; it remains unchanged for any given individual 
but varies from one individual to another. The fitness (per capita reproduction rate) 𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) of an 
individual depends on the strategy x and on interactions with other individuals in the population.  
Let 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) be population density at time t with respect to strategy x; informally, 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) is the 
number of individuals that use x-strategy. 
Assuming overlapping generations and smoothness of 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) in t for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, the population 
dynamics can be described by the following general model: 
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where 𝑁(𝑡) is the total population size and 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) is the pdf of the strategy distribution at time t. 
The initial pdf 𝑃(0, 𝑥) and the initial population size 𝑁(0) are assumed to be given. 
Let 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) be the payoff of an x-individual when it plays against a y-individual. Following 
standard assumptions of evolutionary game theory, assume that individual fitness 𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) is equal 
to the expected payoff that the individual receives as a result of a random pairwise interaction with 
another individual in the population, that is, 
𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) = ∫ 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑃(𝑡, 𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑋
. (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) make up the master model.  
Here our main goal is to study the evolution of the pdf 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) over time. To this end, it is 
necessary to compute population density 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) and total population size 𝑁(𝑡), which will be done 
in the following section. 
 
2. Evolution of Strategy Distribution in Games with Bilinear Payoff Function 
Assume that the payoff 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) has the form  
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑏𝑥𝑦 + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑒𝑦 + 𝑓,                                    (3) 
where 𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑁) is the “background” fitness term that depends on the total population size 𝑁 but 
does not depend on individuals’ traits and interactions; 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑒 are constant coefficients. Then 
𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) = ∫ 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑃(𝑡, 𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑋
= 𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑒𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑓(𝑁),              (4) 
where expected value is notated as 𝐸𝑡[𝑔(𝑥)] = ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
 . 
The population dynamics is defined by the equation 
𝑑𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)(𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑒𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑓(𝑁)).   
This equation can be solved by a version of HKV method developed in [14]-[16]. 
Introduce formally auxiliary variables 𝑠(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡) such that  
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥],  
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑁),   𝑠(0) = 𝑢(0) = 0.                            
Then  
𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑙(0, 𝑥)exp (𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑒𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑥(𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏𝑠(𝑡)),                   
𝑁(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑋
𝑁(0)𝑒  (𝑢(𝑡)+𝑒𝑠(𝑡)) ∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
,            (5)    
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑁(𝑡)
= 𝑃(0, 𝑥)
𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
.                   
 (6) 
Notice that 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) does not depend on 𝑓, 𝑒. Therefore, if one is interested in the distribution of 
strategies and how it changes over time rather than the density of x-individuals, then one can 
replace the reproduction rate given by Equation (4) by the reproduction rate  
𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥. 
Equivalently, one can use the payment function (3) in a simplified form 
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  𝑏𝑥𝑦 + 𝑐𝑥.                                                  (7) 
Then the dynamics of the game is described by the equation 
𝑑𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)(𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥).                          
(8) 
Let 𝑀0(𝜆) = ∫ 𝑒
𝑥𝜆𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
 be the moment generation function (mgf) of the initial distribution. 
Then 
 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] = ∫ 𝑥𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)
𝑋
/ ∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥) =
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑀0(𝜆)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡𝑋 .  (9) 
Now we get an explicit equation for the auxiliary variable 𝑠(𝑡): 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑀0(𝜆)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡.                                                (10) 
The mgf of the current distribution of strategies as given by Eq. (6) is  
𝑀𝑡(𝛿) =
∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+𝛿)𝑋 𝑃(0,𝑥)
∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
=
𝑀0(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+𝛿)
𝑀0(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
                          (11) 
Equations (6), (9) - (11) give us a tool for studying the evolution of distribution of strategies in 
games with bilinear payoff function. Below we study some examples with different initial 
distributions.  
 
  2.1. Normal initial distribution 
Let the initial distribution of strategies be normal 𝑁(𝑚, 𝜎2) with the mean 𝑚 and variance 𝜎2, 
𝑝(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2
exp (−
(𝑥−𝑚)2
2𝜎2
),   ;x                        
it’s mgf is 
𝑀(𝛿) = e
(𝑚𝛿+
𝛿2𝜎2
2
)
.                              
Let us denote 𝑤(𝑡) = 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡; then, according to (11), 
𝑀𝑡(𝛿) =
𝑀0(𝑤(𝑡)+𝛿)
𝑀0(𝑤(𝑡))
= e
(𝑚(𝑤+𝛿)+
(𝑤+𝛿)2𝜎2
2
)−(𝑚𝑤+
(𝑤)2𝜎2
2
)
= e
(𝛿(𝑚+𝑤𝜎2)+
𝛿2𝜎2
2
)
. 
It is the mgf of normal distribution 𝑁(𝑚 + 𝑤𝜎2, 𝜎2).  
Equation (5) for the auxiliary variable reads  
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =  𝑚 + (𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡)𝜎2,  𝑠(0) = 0 
and can be easily solved: 
𝑠(𝑡) =
𝑒𝑏𝜎
2𝑡(𝑐+𝑏𝑚)−𝑏𝑚−𝑐(1+𝑏𝜎2𝑡)
𝑏2𝜎2
.  
Then 
 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =  𝑚 + (𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡)𝜎2 =
𝑒𝑏𝜎
2𝑡(𝑐+𝑏𝑚)−𝑐
𝑏
.                             
Hence, the following proposition is proven: 
Proposition 1. Let the initial distribution of strategies in model (7), (8) be normal 𝑁(𝑚, 𝜎2). Then 
the current distribution at any time is also normal with the same variance and the mean 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =
𝑒𝑏𝜎
2𝑡(𝑐+𝑏𝑚)−𝑐
𝑏
. 
So, if 𝑏 < 0, then 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → −
𝑐
𝑏
; if 𝑏 > 0, then 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → ∞  and the current distribution “goes to 
infinity”. 
 
2.2. Exponential initial distribution 
Let the initial distribution of strategies be exponential, 
𝑃(0, 𝑥) = 𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑚𝑥), 𝑥 ≥ 0   
with the mean 𝐸0[𝑥] =
1
𝑚
 , variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟0[𝑥] =
1
𝑚2
 , and mgf 𝑀0(𝛿) =
𝑚
𝑚−𝛿
. 
Let us denote   
𝑣(𝑡) = 𝑚 − 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡,                                
𝑇 = {min 𝑡: 𝑣(𝑡) = 0}.                
The following proposition immediately follows from equation (6). 
Proposition 2. Let the initial distribution of strategies in model (7), (8) be exponential. Then the 
distribution of strategies at any time 𝑡 < 𝑇 is also exponential,   
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑣(𝑡) 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑣(𝑡)𝑥), 𝑥 ≥ 0   
with the mean 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =
1
𝑣(𝑡)
 , variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡[𝑥] =
1
(𝑣(𝑡))2
 , and mgf 𝑀𝑡(𝛿) =
𝑣(𝑡)
𝑣(𝑡)−𝛿
. 
Indeed, if 𝑃(0, 𝑥) = 𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥 𝑚), then, according to (6), 
 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−𝑚)
∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−𝑚)𝑑𝑥
∞
0
= 𝑣(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑣(𝑡)𝑥).  
All assertions of the Proposition follow from the last equation. 
 
Figure 1 shows an example of the plots of 𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] at initial exponential distribution; Figure 
2 shows the dynamics of the strategy distribution. 
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Figure 1. Plots of 𝑠(𝑡) (left) and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] (right); the values of parameters: 𝑏 = 2, 𝑐 = −2.1, 𝑚 = 1. 
  
Figure 2. Dynamics of the initial exponential distribution; the values of parameters are the same 
as in Figure 1. 
 
Notice, that the model solution exists only up to time 𝑡 < 𝑇 < ∞ for some parameter values; the 
mean of the distribution (as well as the total population size) becomes indefinite as 𝑡 → 𝑇 and the 
distribution tends to “uniform” one (that, of course, is not eligible distribution in (0, ∞)). Figures 
3A, 3B demonstrate this phenomenon.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 3A. Dynamics of the mean (left) and the population size (right); 𝑇 ≈ 1.6;  the values of 
parameters: 𝑏 = 1, 𝑐 = −0.9, 𝑚 = 1, 𝑒 = −0.25. 
Recall that according to equation (5) the total population size for considering model is 
𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑁(0)𝑒  (𝑢(𝑡)+𝑒𝑠(𝑡)) ∫
𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑁(0)𝑒𝑢(𝑡)+𝑒𝑠(𝑡)𝑚
𝑚−𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑐𝑡
𝑋 .
              
 
Figure 3B. Dynamics of the initial exponential distribution; the values of parameters: 𝑏 = 1, 𝑐 =
−0.9, 𝑚 = 1. 
 
 
The only reason of this phenomenon is that the initial exponential distribution is considered on the 
total line [0, ∞). If initial distribution is concentrated in a finite interval, then the model solution 
exists at any time.  
 
 
2.3. Gamma distribution 
Let us consider now general Gamma distribution with the parameters 𝑚, 𝛼, 𝜂: 
𝑃(0, 𝑥) =
𝑚𝛼
Γ(𝛼)
(𝑥 − 𝜂)𝑥𝛼−1e−(𝑥−𝜂)/𝑚, 𝑥 > 𝜂 > 0, 𝛼 > 0                  (12) 
It’s mgf  
𝑀(𝛿) = e𝛿𝜂(
𝑚
𝑚−𝛿
)𝛼, 𝛿 < 𝑚,                         
𝐸[𝑥] = 𝜂 +
𝛼
𝑚
, 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑥] =
𝛼
𝑚2
.                            
The standard exponential distribution is a particular case of Gamma distribution as 𝛼 = 𝜂 =
0. 
Proposition 3. Let the initial distribution of strategies in model (7), (8) be Gamma distribution 
(12) with the parameters 𝑚, 𝛼, 𝜂. Then the distribution of strategies at any time 𝑡 < 𝑇 is also 
Gamma distribution with the parameters  𝑣(𝑡) = 𝑚 − 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡, 𝛼, 𝜂 . 
Indeed, according to equation (11), the mgf of the current distribution is 
𝑀𝑡(𝛿) =
𝑀0(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+𝛿)
𝑀0(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
= e𝜂𝛿(
1−(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)/𝑚
1−(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+𝛿)/𝑚
)𝛼 = e𝜂𝛿(
𝑣(𝑡)
𝑣(𝑡)−𝛿
)𝛼. 
It is the mgf of the Gamma distribution with the parameters 𝑣(𝑡), 𝛼, 𝜂. Q.i.d. 
 
2.4. Exponential distribution truncated in a finite interval 
In most realistic situations the domain where traits take their values is a bounded interval. 
Then, let us assume that the initial distribution is exponential truncated in the interval [𝑎1, 𝑎2], 
𝑃(0, 𝑥) = 𝐶 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑚𝑥), 𝑥 ∈ [𝑎1, 𝑎2]  , 𝐶 = 𝑚/(𝑒−𝑎1 𝑚 − 𝑒−𝑎2 𝑚).           
For this distribution,  
𝐸[𝑥] =
1
𝑚
+
𝑎1𝑒𝑎2 𝑚−𝑎2𝑒𝑎1 𝑚
𝑒𝑎2 𝑚−𝑒𝑎1 𝑚
 ,  𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑥] =
1
𝑚2
−
𝑒(𝑎1+𝑎2)𝑚(𝑎2−𝑎1)2
(𝑒𝑎2 𝑚−𝑒𝑎1 𝑚)2
 ,  
𝑀(𝛿) =
𝑚
𝑒−𝑎1 𝑚−𝑒−𝑎2 𝑚
𝑒𝑎2 𝛿+𝑎1 𝑚−𝑒𝑎1 𝛿+𝑎2 𝑚
𝑚−𝛿
                                (13) 
Proposition 4. Let the initial distribution of strategies in model (7), (8) be exponential truncated 
in the interval [𝑎1, 𝑎2]. Then the distribution of strategies at any time t<T  is exponential truncated 
in the same interval, 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝐶(𝑡) 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑣(𝑡)𝑥), 𝑥 ∈ [𝑎1, 𝑎2]  where 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑡)/(𝑒−𝑎1 𝑣(𝑡) −
𝑒−𝑎2 𝑣(𝑡)) and 𝑣(𝑡) = 𝑚 − 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡. The mean, variance and mgf at t moment are defined by 
formulas (13) with replacing of the parameter m by 𝑣(𝑡).  
The proof easily follows from equation (6). 
 
Evolution of the initial exponential distribution truncated in a finite interval may be different 
dependently of the model parameters, as it is shown in Figures 4-6. 
   
Figure 4. Evolution of the initial exponential distribution truncated in the interval [0,1]; left panel: 
dynamics of the mean; right panel: dynamic of the distribution. The values of parameters: 𝑏 = 𝑐 =
𝑚 = 1. The current distribution tends with time to a distribution concentrated in 𝑥 = 1. 
 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of the initial exponential distribution truncated in the interval [0,1]; left panel: 
dynamics of the mean; right panel: dynamic of the distribution. The values of parameters: 𝑏 =
1, 𝑐 = −2, 𝑚 = 1. The current distribution tends with time to a distribution concentrated in 𝑥 = 0. 
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 Figure 6. Evolution of the initial exponential distribution truncated in the interval [0,1]; left panel: 
dynamics of the mean; right panel: dynamic of the distribution. The values of parameters: 𝑏 =
−2, 𝑐 = 1, 𝑚 = 1. The current distribution tends with time to a uniform distribution in the interval 
[0,1]. 
 
 
2.5. Normal distribution truncated in a finite interval 
 
Now assume that the initial distribution is normal with zero mean, truncated in the interval [−1, 1]:  
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑒
−
𝑥2
2𝜎2, −1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1 with normalization constant 𝐶 = 1/[𝜎√2𝜋 𝐸𝑟𝑓 (
1
√2𝜎
)]. 
Let us denote for brevity 𝛾 =
1
2𝜎2
 , then 
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑒−𝛾𝑥
2
,  𝐶 = √
𝛾
𝜋
1
𝐸𝑟𝑓(𝛾)
− 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1. 
Then 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)−𝛾𝑥
2
∫ 𝑒𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)−𝛾𝑥
2
𝑑𝑥
1
−1
= 
2√
𝛾
𝜋
exp (−
(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)2
4𝛾
)
𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+2𝛾
2√𝛾
)−𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−2𝛾
2√𝛾
)
exp ((𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡)𝑥 − 𝛾𝑥2). 
𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡
2𝛾
+
1
√𝜋𝛾
exp (−
(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+2𝛾)2
4𝛾
(1−exp (2(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡))
 𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+2𝛾
2√𝛾
)−𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−2𝛾
2√𝛾
)
. 
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Ex
 Figure 7. Evolution of the initial normal distribution truncated in the interval [−1,1]; left panel: 
dynamics of the mean; right panel: dynamic of the distribution; the values of parameters: 𝑏 =
−2, 𝑐 = 1, 𝑚 = 1. The current distribution is normal truncated in the interval [−1,1]. 
 
 
3. Evolution of Strategy Distribution in Games with Quadratic Payoff Function 
3.1. The model and it’s solution 
Assume that the payoff 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) has the form 
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) = −𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥𝑦 + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑𝑦2 + 𝑒𝑦 + 𝑓,               (14)  
where 𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑁) is the “background” fitness term; 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒 are constant coefficients. Then 
𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) = ∫ 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑃(𝑡, 𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑋
= 
−𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑𝐸𝑡[𝑥2] + 𝑒𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑓(𝑁),                       (15) 
 
where expected value is notated as 𝐸𝑡[𝑔(𝑥)] = ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
 . 
Now population dynamics is defined by the equation 
𝑑𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)(−𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑𝐸𝑡[𝑥2] + 𝑒𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑓(𝑁)).  
In order to solve this equation, apply again the version of HKV method. Introduce auxiliary 
variables 𝑠(𝑡), ℎ(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡) such that 
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𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥], 
𝑑ℎ
𝑠𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥2],  
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑁), 
 𝑠(0) = ℎ(0) = 𝑢(0) = 0. 
 
Then 
𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑙(0, 𝑥)𝑒  (𝑢(𝑡)+𝑒𝑠(𝑡)+𝑑ℎ(𝑡))𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)),  
𝑁(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑋
𝑁(0)𝑒  (𝑢(𝑡)+𝑒𝑠(𝑡)+𝑑ℎ(𝑡)) ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋 ,
  
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑁(𝑡)
= 𝑃(0, 𝑥)
𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
. (16) 
Notice that 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) depends neither on ℎ(𝑡),𝑢(𝑡) nor on 𝑐, 𝑒. Therefore, if one is interested in 
the distribution of strategies and how it changes over time rather than the density of x-individuals, 
then one can replace the reproduction rate given by Equation (15) by the reproduction rate 
𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) = −𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥] + 𝑐𝑥                                             (17)  
Equivalently, one can use the payment function (14) in a simplified form  
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  −𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥𝑦 + 𝑐𝑥.                              (18)  
The model (1), (2) with payoff function (18} and reproduction rate (17) has the same 
distribution of strategies as model (1), (2) with payoff (14) and reproduction rate (15). 
Next, using Equation (16), one can write 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] in the form 
𝐸𝑡[𝑥] = ∫ 𝑥𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑋
 
∫ 𝑥
𝑋
𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡))𝑃(0, 𝑥)/ ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡))𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
. 
 
Now define the following function Φ(𝑡, 𝜆), such that 
Φ(𝑡, 𝜆) = ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥𝜆𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
. (18) 
Then 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] can be expressed as 
𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =
𝜕Φ(𝑡,𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡))
∂𝜆
/Φ(𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏𝑠(𝑡)).  (19) 
It is now possible to write the explicit equation for the auxiliary variable 𝑠(𝑡) as 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡                            (20) 
 
Next, 
𝐸𝑡[𝑥2] =
𝜕2Φ(𝑡, 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡)
∂𝜆2
/Φ(𝑡, 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡)  
and therefore 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡[𝑥] =
𝜕2Φ(𝑡,𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
∂𝜆2
/Φ(𝑡, 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡) − (
𝜕Φ(𝑡,𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
∂𝜆
/Φ(𝑡, 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡))2. (21) 
The moment generation function (mgf) of the current distribution of strategies as given by 
Equation (16) is 
𝑀𝑡(𝛿) =
∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+𝛿)
𝑋 𝑃(0,𝑥)
∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑡𝑥
2+𝑥(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
=
Φ(𝑡,𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+𝛿)
Φ(𝑡,𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡)
.  (22) 
Equations (18)–(22) now provide a tool for studying the evolution of the distribution of 
strategies of the quadratic payment model over time for any initial distribution. 
3.2. Initial Normal Distribution 
The evolution of normal distribution in games with the quadratic payoff function has already 
been mostly studied; as shown by Oechssier and Riedel [6,8] and Cressman and Hofbauer [5], the 
class of normal distributions is invariant with respect to replicator dynamics in games with 
quadratic payoff functions (14) with positive parameter 𝑎. 
This statement immediately follows from Equation (16) for the current distribution of traits. 
Additionally, the class of normal distributions truncated in a (finite or infinite) interval [𝑎, 𝑏] is 
also invariant, see Section 2.6 for details and examples. 
Now consider the dynamics of initial normal distributions in detail. 
Let the initial distribution be normal with the mean 𝑚 and variance 𝜎2, 
( )
2
22
1 ( )
0, exp
22
x m
P x

 −
= − 
 
, ;x     
Its mgf is given by 
2 2
[ ] exp( )
2
M m
 
 = + . (23) 
Denoting for brevity 𝛾 =
1
2𝜎2
 , one can compute the function Φ(𝑡, 𝜆): 
Φ(𝑡, 𝜆) = ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑥
2𝑡+𝑥𝜆𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
∞
−∞
= √𝛾/𝜋 ∫ 𝑒−𝑥
2𝑎𝑡+𝑥𝜆−𝛾(𝑥−𝑚)2 𝑑𝑥
∞
−∞
=
√
𝛾
𝛾+𝑎𝑡
exp (
𝜆2+4𝛾𝜆𝑚−4𝑎𝛾𝑚2𝑡
4(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
). 
 
Next, 
𝜕Φ(𝑡,𝜆)
∂𝜆
= √
𝛾
𝛾+𝑎𝑡
2𝛾𝑚+𝜆
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
exp (
𝜆2+4𝛾𝜆𝑚−4𝑎𝛾𝑚2𝑡
4(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
) ,  
so 
𝜕Φ(𝑡,𝜆)
∂𝜆
/Φ(𝑡, 𝜆) =
𝜆+2𝛾𝑚
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
.  
Then, according to Equation (20), the following explicit equation for auxiliary keystone 
variable emerges: 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑠+𝑐𝑡+2𝛾𝑚
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
, 𝑠(0) = 0.   
This equation can be solved analytically as follows: 
𝑠(𝑡) =
𝑐
𝑏(2𝑎−𝑏)
(𝑏𝑡 + 2𝛾 (1 − (1 +
𝑎𝑡
𝛾
)
𝑏
2𝑎
) −
2𝑚𝛾
𝑏
(1 − (1 +
𝑎𝑡
𝛾
)
𝑏
2𝑎
). (24) 
Now it is possible to compute the mean, variance, and current distribution of strategies using 
Equations (18)–(22). In the case of normal initial distribution, the simplest way to do so is to use 
Equation (22) for the current mgf. 
Indeed, using formula (22) and after simple algebra, one can write the current mgf as 
𝑀𝑡(𝛿) =
Φ(𝑡,𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝛿))
Φ(𝑡,𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)))
= exp (
𝛿(𝜆+2𝑚𝛾)
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
+
𝛿2
4(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
).  
It is exactly the mgf of normal distribution (23) with the mean 
𝜆+2𝑚𝛾
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
 and variance 
1
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
 . 
Remembering that 𝜆 = 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡 and using Equation (24}, after some algebra the mean of 
the current strategy distribution takes the form 
𝐸𝑡[𝑥] = (1 +
𝑎𝑡
𝛾
)
𝑏
2𝑎
−1
(𝑚 −
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
) +
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
.  (25) 
Proposition 5. Let the initial distribution of strategies in model (1),(2) (18) be normal 
𝑁(𝑚, 𝜎2). Then the distribution of strategies at any time t is normal with the mean 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] given by 
Equation (25} and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡[𝑥] =
1
2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
=
𝜎2
1+2𝑎𝑡𝜎2
. 
It is easy to see that if 2𝑎 − 𝑏 > 0, then (1 +
𝑎𝑡
𝛾
)
𝑏
2𝑎
−1
→ 0 and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] →
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
 as 𝑡 → ∞; if 2𝑎 −
𝑏 < 0, then (1 +
𝑎𝑡
𝛾
)
𝑏
2𝑎
−1
→ ∞; therefore 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → ∞ if 𝑚 >
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
 and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → −∞ if 𝑚 <
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
 
as 𝑡 → ∞. 
Notice that 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → 𝑚 +
𝑐
2𝑎
 ln (1 +
𝑎𝑡
𝛾
) as 𝑏 → 2𝑎 , so 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → ∞ if 2𝑎 − 𝑏 ≤ 0. 
Figure 8 shows the dynamics of the mean of current distribution of traits. 
 
Figure 8. Dynamics of the mean value of current strategy distribution given by Equation 
(25} as 𝑚 = 0; b = 3 (red), b = 1 (blue); other parameters: 𝑎 = 𝑐 = 𝛾 = 1. 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] → ∞ 
when 2𝑎 − 𝑏 ≤ 0; 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] →
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
 when 2𝑎 − 𝑏 > 0. 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the distribution of traits over time. The variance of the current 
distribution 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡[𝑥] =
𝜎2
1+2𝑎𝑡𝜎2
 tends to 0; therefore, the distribution of traits over time tends to a 
distribution concentrated at the point 𝑥 =
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
 for 2𝑎 − 𝑏 > 0. 
 
Figure 9. Evolution of the pdf 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) as given by Equation (24}. The initial distribution 
is normal with 𝑚 = 0, 𝜎2 = 1; parameters of the model are 𝑎 = 2, 𝑏 = 1, 𝑐 = 1. 
3.3. Exponential Initial Distributions 
Let the initial distribution be exponential in [0, ∞), 𝑃(0, 𝑥) = 𝑣𝑒−𝑣𝑥 . Then 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑒−𝑎𝑥
2𝑡+𝑥(𝜆−𝑣)
∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑥
2𝑡+𝑥(𝜆−𝑣)𝑑𝑥
∞
0
= 2√
𝑎𝑡
𝜋
𝑒
−𝑎𝑡(𝑥−
𝜆−𝑣
2𝑎𝑡
)2
1+𝐸𝑟𝑓[
𝜆−𝑣
2√𝑎𝑡
]
, (26) 
where 𝜆 = 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡. 
Equation (26) for any 𝑡 > 0 describes the density of the normal distribution with the mean 
𝑚(𝑡) =
𝜆−𝑣
2𝑎𝑡
=
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−𝑣
2𝑎𝑡
 and variance 𝜎2(𝑡) =
1
2𝑎𝑡
 truncated on [0, ∞). Notably, the mean of the 
truncated normal distribution (26) is not equal to 𝑚(𝑡), and its variance is not equal to 𝜎2(𝑡). 
Instead, the mean of distribution (26} is 
𝐸𝑡[𝑥] = 𝑚(𝑡) +
𝑒
−
(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣)2
4𝑎𝑡
√𝜋𝑎𝑡(1+𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣
2√𝑎𝑡
))
.  (27) 
In order to compute the mean given by Equation (27) and the current distribution (26) as a 
function of time one needs to solve for the auxiliary variable 𝑠(𝑡) that can be done using the 
function Φ(𝑡, 𝜆): 
Φ(𝑡, 𝜆) = 𝑣 ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑥
2𝑡+𝑥𝜆−𝑣𝑥𝑑𝑥
∞
0
=
√𝜋 
2√𝑎𝑡
𝑣(1 + 𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝜆−𝑣
2√𝑎𝑡
))𝑒
(𝜆−𝑣)2
4𝑎𝑡 .   
Then, according to Equation (20), 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡= 
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣
2𝑎𝑡
+
𝑒
−
(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣)2
4𝑎𝑡
√𝜋𝑎𝑡(1+𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣
2√𝑎𝑡
))
, 𝑠(0) = 0.   
This equation can be solved numerically. Using the solution 𝑠(𝑡), we can compute the 
distribution (26) and all its moments. 
It follows from Equation (27), that 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞𝐸
𝑡[𝑥] = 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞𝑚(𝑡) =
𝑐
2𝑎
+
𝑏
2𝑎
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑠(𝑡)
𝑡
.  
Denote 𝐿 =
𝑠(𝑡)
𝑡
; notice that 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞
𝑠(𝑡)
𝑡
= 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
 , therefore  
𝐿 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞ (
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣
2𝑎𝑡
+
𝑒
−
(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣)2
4𝑎𝑡
√𝜋𝑎𝑡(1+𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑣
2√𝑎𝑡
))
) =
𝑐
2𝑎
+
𝑏
2𝑎
𝐿, hence 𝐿 =
𝑐
2𝑎−𝑏
.  
Therefore 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞ 𝐸
𝑡[𝑥] =
𝑐
2𝑎
(
𝑏
2𝑎−𝑏
+ 1).  
The variance of the current distribution tends to 0, so the limit distribution tends to a 
distribution concentrated in the point 𝑥 =
𝑐
2𝑎
(
𝑏
2𝑎−𝑏
+ 1). This proves the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. Let the initial distribution of strategies be exponential. Then the current 
distribution is normal at any time 𝑡 > 0 that tends to a distribution concentrated in the point 𝑥 =
𝑐
2𝑎
(
𝑏
2𝑎−𝑏
+ 1). 
An example of the dynamics of the current mean and variance is given on Figure10. Figure 11 
shows the dynamics of the initial exponential distribution that turns to a truncated normal distribution 
with its variance tending to 0. Therefore, the current distribution tends to a distribution 
concentrated in the point 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐸𝑡[𝑥] = 1 as 𝑡 → ∞. 
  
Figure 10. Plots of the mean (left) and variance (right) of distribution (26) with 𝑎 = 𝑏 =
𝑐 = 𝑣 = 1. 
 
Figure 11. Evolution of the distribution of strategies over time given initial exponential 
distribution (26} with 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 𝑐 = 𝑣 = 1. 
3.4. Uniform Initial Distribution 
Now assume that the initial distribution is uniform in the interval [−1, 1]. Then 
Φ(𝑡, 𝜆) = ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑥
2𝑡+𝑥𝜆𝑑𝑥 =
1
2
√
𝜋
𝑎𝑡
exp (
𝜆2
4𝑎𝑡
)
1
−1
 (𝐸𝑟𝑓 (
−𝜆+2𝑎𝑡
2√𝑎𝑡
) +
𝐸𝑟𝑓 (
𝜆+2𝑎𝑡
2√𝑎𝑡
))  
 
and the current distribution 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑁(𝑡)
=
𝑒−𝑎𝑥
2𝑡+𝑥(𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡))
Φ(𝑡,𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡))
. (28) 
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The auxiliary variable 𝑠(𝑡) can be computed using Equation (20}, or, equivalently, directly 
using the expression (28} for the current pdf: 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] = ∫ 𝑥𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
1
−1
 
 
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)
2𝑎𝑡
+
1
√𝜋𝑎𝑡
exp(−
(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+2𝑎𝑡)2
4𝑎𝑡
)−exp (−
(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−2𝑎𝑡)2
4𝑎𝑡
)
𝐸𝑟𝑓(
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+2𝑎𝑡
2√𝑎𝑡
)+𝐸𝑟𝑓(
−𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑐𝑡+2𝑎𝑡
2√𝑎𝑡
)
. 
 
For a positive parameter 𝑎, the distribution 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) is normal with the mean 𝐸(𝑡) =
𝑐𝑡+𝑏𝑠(𝑡)
2𝑎𝑡
 
and variance 𝜎2(𝑡) =
1
2𝑎𝑡
 truncated in the interval [−1, 1]. However, for negative values of 
parameter 𝑎 the distribution (28} is not normal; more specifically, if parameter b is also negative, 
then the initial distribution evolves towards a U-shaped distribution, as can be seen Figure 12 
(right). 
  
Figure 12. Evolution of the distribution of strategies over time given initial uniform 
distribution in [−1, 1]; left panel: 𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = −10, 𝑐 = 1; right panel: 𝑎 = −1, 𝑏 =
−10, 𝑐 = 1. 
3.5. Normal Initial Distribution Truncated in the Interval [−1, 1] 
Now assume the initial distribution is normal with zero mean, truncated in the interval [−1, 
1]: 
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑒−𝛾𝑥
2
, −1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1,  
with normalization constant 𝐶 = 1/[𝛾√𝜋 𝐸𝑟𝑓(𝛾)]. 
Using the theory developed above, Equation (16), one can show that the current distribution of 
strategies is given by the formula 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
2𝑒
−
(𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡−2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)𝑥)2
4(𝛾+𝑎𝑡) √𝛾+𝑎𝑡
√𝜋(𝐸𝑟𝑓[
−𝑏𝑠(𝑡)−𝑐𝑡+2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
2√𝛾+𝑎𝑡
]+𝐸𝑟𝑓[
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)+𝑐𝑡+2(𝛾+𝑎𝑡)
2√𝛾+𝑎𝑡
])
.                   (29) 
 The distribution (29) is again normal truncated in the interval [−1, 1]. The current mean value that 
defines Equation (20) for the auxiliary variable 𝑠(𝑡) can be computed using Equation (19) or using 
the expression (29) for the current pdf. This way one can obtain a (rather bulky) equation for 𝑠(𝑡) 
that can be solved numerically. With this solution, one can trace the evolution of the initial truncated 
normal distribution. It can be shown that for 𝑎 > 0 the variance of the current distribution tends to 
0; therefore, the current distribution tends to a distribution concentrated in the point 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] as 
𝑡 → ∞. The value of 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] depends on model parameters. Three examples of the evolution of 
strategy distribution are given in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Evolution of the distribution of strategies over time given the initial truncated 
normal distribution. (A) 𝑎 = 5, 𝑏 = −2, 𝑐 = −10, 𝜎2 = 10; (B) 𝑎 = −5, 𝑏 = −2, 𝑐 =
1 𝛾 = 10; (C) 𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = −2, 𝑐 = 1, 𝛾 = 10. 
More generally, one can consider the normal distribution truncated in a finite interval [𝑎, 𝑏] 
or in a half-line [𝑎, ∞). Then it follows from Equation (16) that the current distribution is also 
normal truncated in that interval. 
Proposition 7. The class of truncated normal distributions is invariant with respect to replicator 
dynamics in games with quadratic payoff functions (18) with positive parameter 𝑎. 
In contrast, one can observe another kind of evolution of the initial truncated normal 
distribution for 𝑎 < 0. Specifically, the current distribution has a U-shape and tends to a distribution 
concentrated in two extremal points of the interval where the initial distribution is defined, as can be 
seen in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Evolution of the distribution of strategies over time given the initial normal 
distribution truncated in [−1, 1]; 𝑎 = −10, 𝑏 = −6, 𝑐 = 1, 𝛾 = 10. 
4. Generalization 
The developed approach can be applied to a more general version of the payoff function: 
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  𝑓1(𝑥) + 𝑓2(𝑥)𝑓3(𝑦) + 𝑓4(𝑦).   
In this case 
𝑑𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) ∫ (𝑓1(𝑥) + 𝑓2(𝑥)𝑓3(𝑦) + 𝑓4(𝑦))𝑃(𝑡, 𝑦)𝑑𝑦𝑋 =
𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥), 
 
where 𝐹(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑓1(𝑥) + 𝑓2(𝑥)𝐸
𝑡[𝑓3] + 𝐸
𝑡[𝑓4]. 
Let us introduce auxiliary variables 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑓3], 
𝑑ℎ
𝑠𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑓4], 𝑠(0) = ℎ(0) = 0.   
Then 
𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑙(0, 𝑥) exp[𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡 + 𝑓2(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡) + ℎ(𝑡)], 
𝑁(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑥
𝑁(0)𝑒  ℎ(𝑡) ∫ 𝑒𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡+𝑓2(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
, 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑁(𝑡)
= 𝑃(0, 𝑥)
𝑒𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡+𝑓2(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)
∫ 𝑒𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡+𝑓2(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
 .            (30) 
 
One can see that the pdf 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) does not depend on the variable ℎ(𝑡) and hence on the function 
𝑓4(𝑦). 
It follows from (30} that 
𝐸𝑡[𝑓3] = ∫ 𝑓3(𝑥)𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =𝑥   
∫ 𝑓3(𝑥)𝑥 𝑒
𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡+𝑓2(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)/ ∫ 𝑒𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡+𝑓2(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑋
. 
 
Then the equation 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑓3], 𝑠(0) = 0  (3) 
can be solved, at least numerically. 
Another equivalent approach may also be useful. Define the function 
Φ(𝑡, 𝜆, 𝛿) = ∫ 𝑒𝑓1(𝑥)𝑡+𝛿𝑓2(𝑥)+𝜆𝑓3(𝑥)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑥
.   
Then 
𝐸𝑡[𝑓3] =
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆,𝛿)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=0,𝛿=𝑠(𝑡).  
This results in a closed equation for the auxiliary variable 𝑠(𝑡): 
𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑓2] =
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆,𝛿)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=0,𝛿=𝑡+𝑐𝑠(𝑡). (42) 
 
Having the solution to equations (31) or (32), one can compute the current pdf (30) and all 
statistical characteristics of interest, such as the current mean and variance of strategies given any 
initial distribution. 
Example 1. Let 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑔(𝑦).  
Then, according to equation (30), 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑃(0, 𝑥)
𝑒𝑓(𝑥)𝑡
∫ 𝑒𝑓(𝑥)𝑡𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
. 
Therefore, in this case the current distribution depends only on the function 𝑓(𝑥) 
and does not depend on the payoff that an individual receives from interactions with 
other individuals.   
Example 2. Let 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  𝑓(𝑥)𝑔(𝑦).  
 
In this case 
𝑑𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝐸𝑡[𝑔].   
Introduce the auxiliary variable by the equation 
𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑔], 𝑠(0) = 0. 
Then 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑙(0, 𝑥)𝑒𝑓(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡), and 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑃(0, 𝑥)
𝑒𝑓(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)
∫ 𝑒𝑓(𝑥)𝑠(𝑡)𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
.                         (33) 
Define the function Φ(𝑡, 𝜆, 𝛿) = ∫ 𝑒𝛿𝑓(𝑥)+𝜆𝑔(𝑥)𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑥
. 
 
Then 𝐸𝑡[𝑔] =
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆,𝛿)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=0,𝛿=𝑠(𝑡), and a closed equation for the auxiliary variable 
𝑠(𝑡) is obtained: 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑔] =
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆,𝛿)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=0,𝛿=𝑠(𝑡). 
 Having solution to this equation one can compute the current pdf according to 
Equation (33). 
 
  
Example 3 (see [12], Example 1). Let 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  −𝑎𝑥4 + 4𝑥𝑦. Then  
𝑑𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑙(𝑡, 𝑥)(−𝑎𝑥4 + 4𝑥𝐸𝑡[𝑥]). 
Introduce the auxiliary variable by the equation 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥], 𝑠(0) = 0. Then 
𝑃(𝑡, 𝑥) =
𝑙(𝑡,𝑥)
𝑁(𝑡)
= 𝑃(0, 𝑥)
exp(−𝑎𝑥4𝑡+4𝑥𝑠(𝑡))
∫ exp(−𝑎𝑥4𝑡+4𝑥𝑠(𝑡))𝑃(0,𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑋
 .         (34)  
Define the function  Φ(𝑡, 𝜆) = ∫ 𝑒−𝑎𝑥
4𝑡+𝜆𝑥𝑃(0, 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑥
. Then 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑥] =
𝜕𝑙𝑛Φ(𝑡,𝜆)
∂𝜆
/𝜆=4𝑠(𝑡).  
This equation can be solved (at least, numerically), allowing one to then compute the pdf 
according to Equation (34). 
5. Discussion 
Classical problems of evolutionary game theory are concentrated on studying equilibrium 
states (such as evolutionarily stable states and Nash equilibria). Notably, it takes indefinite time to 
reach any equilibrium when starting from a from non-trivial initial distribution of strategies in 
continuous-time models. Therefore, the evolution of a given initial distribution over time may be 
of great interest and potentially critical importance for studying real population dynamics. 
Here I developed a method that allows extending the analysis of evolution of continuous strategy 
distributions in games with a quadratic payoff function. Specifically, the method described here 
allows us to answer the question: given an initial distribution of strategies in a game, how will it 
evolve over time? Typically, the dynamics of population distributions are governed by replicator 
equations, which appear both in evolutionary game theory, as well as in analysis of the dynamics of 
non-homogeneous populations and communities. The approach suggested here is based on the HKV 
(hidden keystone variable) method developed in References [9–11] for analysis of the dynamics of 
inhomogeneous populations and finding solutions of corresponding replicator equations. The 
method allows the computing of the current strategy distribution and all statistical characteristics of 
interest, such as current mean and variance, of the current distribution given any initial distribution 
at any time. 
I looked at several specific examples of initial distributions: 
o Normal 
o Exponential 
o Truncated exponential in [0,1] 
o Uniform on [−1, 1] 
o Truncated normal on [−1, 1] 
Through the application of the proposed method, I confirm the existing results given in 
References [5,6], that the family of normal distributions is invariant in a game with a quadratic payoff 
function with negative quadratic term. Additionally, I derive explicit formulas for the current 
distribution, its mean and variance. I show also that the class of truncated normal distributions is 
also invariant with respect to replicator dynamics in games with quadratic payoff functions; as an 
example, I consider in detail the case of initial normal distribution truncated in [−1, 1]. 
Notably and unexpectedly, in most cases, regardless of initial distribution, the current 
distribution of strategies in games with negative quadratic term is normal, standard or truncated. 
Over time it evolves towards a distribution concentrated in a single point that is equal to the limit 
values of the mean of the current normal distribution. This can have implications for a broad class 
of questions pertaining to evolution of strategies in games. 
For instance, the question of whether the limit state of the population is mono - or polymorphic 
was discussed in the literature. Here I show that for games with a quadratic payoff function, the 
population tends to a monomorphic stable state if the quadratic term is negative. In contrast, if the 
quadratic term of the payoff function is positive and the initial distribution is concentrated in a finite 
interval, then the current distribution can have a U-shape, and then the population tends to a di-
morphic state. 
In the last section I extend the developed approach to games with payoff functions of the form 
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) =  𝑓1(𝑥) + 𝑓2(𝑥)𝑓3(𝑦) + 𝑓4(𝑦). Formally, this framework can be applied to a very broad 
class of payoff functions, which include exponential or polynomial payoff functions; however, in many 
cases finding a solution to the equation for the auxiliary variable can be a difficult computational 
problem. 
To summarize, the proposed method is validated against previously published results, and is 
then applied to a previously unsolvable class of problems. Application of this method could help 
expand the class of questions and answers that can now be obtained for a large class of problems 
in evolutionary game theory. 
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